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(1921) 289 Mo. 493, 233 S. W. 397; Havel v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co.
(1913) 120 Minn. 195, 139 N. W. 137. The sort of negligence which will
outweigh plaintiff's contributory negligence has most often been character-
ized as "willful and wanton," although the term "gross negligence" has
been used in some cases under this rule. Simon v. Detroit United Ry.
(1917) 196 Mich. 586, 162 N. W. 1012; Davis v. Saginaw-Bay City Ry. Co.
(1916) 191 Mich. 131, 157 N. W. 390. Therefore the court was reasonably
justified in placing "gross negligence," as defined in the opinion, in the
same category with willful and wanton negligence as the phrase is used in
the cases where the plaintiff's negligence is discounted. The feature of
the case which is ratler strange, as appears only from the opinion, is the
designation of a mere violation of a highway statute as "gross negligence."
In the cases supporting the rule excusing contributory negligence, willful
misconduct, or misconduct so wanton and in reckless disregard of life and
property as to raise a presumption of intention, has been the controlling
consideration. In several cases, the violation of a highway statute has been
expressly declared not to amount to "gross negligence." Hopkins v. Drop-
pers (1924) 184 Wis. 400, 198 N. W. 738; Ludke v. Burek (1915) '160 Wis.
440, 152 N. W. 190; Riggles v. Priest (1916) 163 Wis. 199, 157 N. W. 755;
Huddy, AUTOMOBILES (8th ed.) sec. 364. It would seem that something
more is required to constitute gross negligence than the mere fact of driv-
ing on the wrong side of the street, since the violation of statutes and
ordinances of this type are regularly held to amount only to negligence
per se. Cabanne v. St. Louis Car Co. (1913) 178 Mo. A. 718, 161 S. W.
597; Yellow Cab Co. v. Carlsen (1918) 211 Ill. App. 299; Baird v. Ridge-
way (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) 268 S. W. 1058; Alexander v. Industrial Board
(1917) 281 Ill. 201, 117 N. E. 1040; Huddy, AUTOAOBILES (8th ed.) sec.
360. W. V. W., '30.
TRUSTS-RETENTION OF CONTROL BY SETTLOR-TESTAMENTARY DIsPosi-
TIONS.-To what extent may the settlor of a trust wherein the beneficiaries
are to take after his death retain control over the property during his life
without conforming to the requirements for the execution of a will? Since
the practice of entrusting the management of property and its disposition
after death to trust companies has become common, the question of the
amount of power which the settlor may validly reserve has become increas-
ingly important. A recent Illinois case holds that the reservation to the
settlor of the rights to the net income of the property for life, to approve
loans made by the trustee, to have his debts paid out of the trust estate, to
make a division of the real estate among his children which should bind the
trustee, and to revoke or alter the deed in whole or in part, does not make
the instrument a testamentary disposition, and void for lack of proper exe-
cution. Bear v. Millikin Trust Co. (Ill. 1929) 168 N. E. 349.
It is elementary that the fact that the settlor reserves a life estate in the
property does not make the disposition testamentary. Lewis v. Curnutt
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(1906) 130 Iowa 423, 106 N. W. 914; Scrivens v. North Eastern Savings
Bank (1896) 166 Mass. 255, 44 N. E. 251; Smith v. Savings Bank (1887) 64
N. H. 224, 8 Atl. 792. Nor does the additional fact that the settlor reserves
the right to revoke the trust. Bowdoin College v. Merrett (1896) 75 F.
480; Booth v. Oakland Bank (1898) 122 Cal. 19, 34 Pac. 370; Lewis v. Cur-
nutt, above. But where the settlor retains other elements of control the
question arises whether the court should not declare the instrument incap-
able of creating a valid trust. There are two reasons for this: first, that
such control is reserved to the settlor as to constitute the trustee a mere
agent, whose authority is revoked by the death of the settlor, and second,
that the instrument is an attempted testamentary disposition without statu-
tory execution. Both are based upon the same factor, the retention of con-
trol by the settlor, so they may be considered together.
How completely must the settlor part with the property constituting the
trust? The rule was laid down in Warseo v. Oshkosh Savings and Trust
Co. (1924) 183 Wis. 156, 196 N. W. 829, that "there must be an alienation
of the donor's property constituting the trust to the trustee and under such
terms that when the trust is executed a benefit accrues to the cestui que
trust unless prevented by a condition subsequent resulting from the lawful
revocation of the trust. If the donor has full control and dominion over the
trust property, so that according to the terms of the trust he can use it as
and when he pleases, the trustee becomes his mere agent to hold title to the
property, invest, sell, and collect income for him and pay as he directs."
Applying this reasoning the court held, "In the present case the only thing
the donor parted with irrevocably, and that only in case of his death before
the trust property was consumed, was that the remainder should go as di-
rected. But that was an attempted testamentary disposition of property
and not made in pursuance of the statute." In a leading case on similar
facts, McEvoy v. Boston Five Cents Say. Bank (1909) 201 Mass. 50, 87 N.
E. 465, the court in speaking of the settlor declared, "Her rights as bene-
ficial owner during her life were not limited in any material way.
The other part of the trust created by the instrument in the present case
relates solely to the disposition of the property after the assignor's death.
It follows that the only material effect of the instrument was testamentary."
This doctrine of determining the character of an instrument purporting
to create a trust by its material effect is now not accepted in most jurisdic-
tions, the leading case against it being Kelly v. Parker (1899) 181 Ill. 49, 54
N. E. 615. This case lays down the rule that if an instrument purports to
be a deed in praesenti, subject to certain reservations, conditions, and trusts,
it will be considered a deed in praesenti despite the character of the reserva-
tions and conditions. See also Roberts v. Taylor (C. C. A. 9, 1924) 300 F.
257; Nat. Newark & Essex Banking Co. v. Rosahl (1925) 97 N. J. Eq. 74,
128 At. 586; Wilcox v. Hubbell (1917) 197 Mich. 21, 163 N. W. 497. The
rule seems unreasonable, but it may be logically defended. The only estate
reserved is a mere life estate; the fee passes according to the terms of the
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trust. "The powers of revocation and of directing a certain division of the
property were only powers, and not estates, and did not enlarge the life es-
tate. His deed conveyed to the grantee all the title he possessed, which was
his fee." Bear v. Millikin Trust Co., above. Consequently the deed is con-
sidered a good deed in praesenti, and its validity cannot be questioned. The
case was undoubtedly decided correctly according to the Illinois law as laid
down in Kelly v. Parker, above, but it is difficult to see how the instrument,
both in purpose and effect, was more than a testamentary disposition plus
an appointment of an agent to manage the property. See "Testamentary
Instrument" 8 Words and Phrases (First Series) 693; 7 Words and Phrases
(Third Series) 452.
Let us return to our original problem: How can a person who does not
want to make a will provide for the disposal of his property after his death
and nevertheless maintain his ability to control and dispose of it during his
life? If he makes a trust deed reserving an estate for life and providing
that all his property at his death should go as directed, the instrument will
be declared testamentary; if he tries to reserve an estate to himself under
which he would have the rights he desires to keep, the instrument will be a
nullity, for a fee cannot be reserved out of a fee; but if he makes a deed
purporting to convey the property in praesenti, reserves a life estate, and
provides he is to have certain powers of control and disposition, most juris-
dictions will hold that a valid trust has been created, and, because of a mere
difference in words, will effectuate an intention which, if expressed differ-
ently, they would have refused sanction. J. A. G., '31.
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